Power-Sharing Agreements In Deeply Divided Societies
If Rudolf Rummel`s calculations are pretty much accurate in Death by Government, the last century was the deadliest in human history. Power-sharing purports to offer a certain prospect of reducing domestic lethality and war in human affairs. The argument in favour of power-sharing is more sophisticated than the realization that what cannot be won on the battlefield is the best way to be awarded through a common forum and a common executive. Power sharers follow Rousseau`s stated method in The Social Contract, which recommends taking “men as they are and laws as they might be,” but because they seek not only a community, they reject Rousseau`s special proposals as disastrous, namely inalienable, inalienable, indivisible and absolutely sovereign, rejection of partial associations and a homogeneous bourgeois religion. Power shareholders do not seek a social contract between a united people; they seek social contracts for conviviality between divided communities or between territorial governments. The first of these possibilities leads to so-called “conso ciales” directions; the second leads to a territorial or federal division of power. These two possibilities can be combined into complex forms, as we shall see. Consoative theory has dominated scientific debates about the institutions most appropriate for pacifying and democratic transitions in deeply divided societies. What can power-sharing agreements bring beyond the post-conflict dispute settlement framework? What other factors are important in the long run? In preparation for Harvard University, this paper compares a wide range of countries around the world to study the effects of formal power-sharing institutions and suggests that investments in fundamental human development are a more effective strategy for strengthening democracy and good governance. There are philological and etymological similarities between sharing and division that explain this confusion: through division, people or groups end up receiving shares.
But power-sharing and the separation of powers are different, though potentially divergent, views. Power-sharing requires both coordination in joint decision-making and autonomy in group or territorial decision-making. On the other hand, the separation of powers does not require a coordinated political decision-making system. Rather, it is expected that policy and order will result from the separation of powers (if any) of ambitious leaders, dispersed in several institutions, and that separation is not organized to facilitate the organization of the group. Communities of power strive to share power beyond national, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups by making common decisions within executives, legislative bodies and magistrates; Power dividers try to break the formation of these groups and individualize what they denigrate as local politics.